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for a court to tackle. The majority in Baker v. Carr (1962) and 
Reynolds v. Sims (1964) thought not. Which was right? The Court 
has had many subsequent opportunities to intervene in representa-
tion questions, many of which are discussed in this book. It will 
doubtless have many more in years to come. This book tells us 
much about an important branch of the representation debate. But 
what does the branch tell us about the tree? 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A CIVIL RIGHTS STRAT-
EGY FOR AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY. By Clint Bo-
lick.! San Francisco, Calif.: Pacific Research Institute for 
Public Policy. 1990. Pp. xiii, 158. Cloth, $24.95; paper, 
$12.95. 
PROPERTY AND THE POLffiCS OF ENTITLEMENT. 
By John Brigham.2 Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University 
Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 223. Cloth, $39.95. 
REGULATORY TAKING: THE LIMITS OF LAND USE 
CONTROLS.3 Edited by G. Richard Hill.4 Chicago, Ill.: 
Section of Urban, State and Local Government Law, Ameri-
can Bar Association. 1990. Pp. xix, 422. Paper, $49.95. 
James W. Ely, Jr. s 
As these books demonstrate, judicial and scholarly interest in 
I. Director, Landmark Legal Foundation Center for Civil Rights. 
2. Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
3. This collection consists of the following essays: C. Thomas Williamson, Ill, Consti-
tutional and Judicial Limitations on the Community's Power to Downzone; Robert E. Manley, 
Inverse Condemnation Under42 U.S. C. Section 1983; Margaret V. Lang, Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City: Fairness and Accommodation Show the Way Out of the 
Takings Comer; Kenneth B. Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Acts to Recover Money Domagesfor 
the Overregulation of Land; Robert H. Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the 
Whole Equal to the Sum of Its Parts; Ray Mulligan, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV CorporatioJL· Another Excursion into the Takings Dilemma; Jonathan B. Sallet, Regu-
latory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme Coun's Search for a Solution Contin-
ues; Robert H. Freilich, Alison M. Francis, and Steven L. Popejoy, Excerpt from State and 
Local Government at the Crossroads: A Bitterly Divided Supreme Coun Reevaluates Federal-
ism in the Bicentennial Year of the Constitution; Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regulatory Takings: 
Beyond the Balancing Test; David L. Callies, Property Rights: Are There Any Left?; John 
Mixon, Compensation Claims Against Local Governments for Excessive Land-Use Regula-
tions: A Proposal for More Efficient State Level Adjudication; Michael M. Berger, Happy 
Binhday, Constitution: The Supreme Coun Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use 
Planning. 
4. Member, State of Washington Bar and Vice Chair of American Bar Association 
Land Use Planning and Zoning Committee. 
5. Professor of Law and History, Vanderbilt University. 
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the constitutional rights of property owners has recently awakened 
after decades of slumber. From the 1790's until the constitutional 
revolution of 1937, the federal courts championed property rights 
against legislative interference.6 Following the political triumph of 
the New Deal, however, the Supreme Court largely withdrew from 
the field of economic rights. Yet, by 1990 there were signs of a sea 
change. Stressing the importance of property ownership as a bul-
wark of individual liberty and limited government, a group of schol-
ars has forcefully urged the Supreme Court to resume its traditional 
role as the defender of property rights. 1 In a series of decisions the 
Supreme Court,s lower federal courts,9 and leading state courts 
have given renewed vigor to the takings clause of the fifth amend-
ment. to Even a critic of this trend has observed that courts are 
"more receptive to attacks on economic regulation than they have 
been in half a century."ll These developments have stirred a lively 
debate about the place of property rights in contemporary constitu-
tional thought. 
The most ambitious and provocative of these works is Clint 
Bolick's Unfinished Business: A Civil Rights Strategy for America's 
Third Century. Bolick starts by taking to task "the contemporary 
civil rights establishment." He accuses the civil rights leadership of 
abandoning the original objective of equal treatment for individuals. 
Instead, the civil rights movement has increasingly stressed group 
entitlements and benefits conferred on the basis of race. According 
to Bolick, this strategy has failed, and has helped to shatter the na-
tional consensus favoring civil rights and equal opportunity. 
Bolick advocates an alternative program to vindicate civil 
rights and assist the disadvantaged. He urges an empowerment 
6. James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of 
Property Rights (Oxford U. Press, 1991). 
7. Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution (U. of Chicago Press, 
1980); Stephen Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution (CATO Institute, 1986). 
8. E.g., Nollan v. Co/ifornia Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). See also Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor's separate opinion in Preseault v. ICC, 110 S. Ct. 914, 926 (1990). 
9. E.g., Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 485 
U.S. 940 (1988); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. 
den. 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); William J. (Jack) Jones Insurance Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 
F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1990). 
10. E.g., Allingham v. City of Seattle, 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988); Seawall 
Assoc. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1989), cert. 
den. 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). 
11. Bernard Schwartz, The New Right and the Constitution: Turning Back the Legal 
Clock 256 (Northeastern U. Press, 1990). See also Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison and 
Herman Belz, 2 The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development 748 (W. W. Norton 
& Co., 7th ed. 1991) (noting that Rehnquist Court was "more sympathetic to property own-
ers than any Court since the 1930s"). 
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strategy that fuses economic liberty with individual rights, and em-
phasizes expanded economic opportunity rather than the redistribu-
tion of existing wealth. "Economic liberty is essential to individual 
empowerment," he asserts. Bolick is sharply critical of governmen-
tally imposed entry barriers to new business enterprises and occupa-
tional licensing arrangements. In his view such regulations often 
foster de facto monopolies of entrenched interests and handicap 
those on the economic fringes. Bolick also disputes the post-New 
Deal practice of judicial deference to legislative control of economic 
matters. "The judicial nullification of economic liberty," he 
charges, "stands as one of the most pervasive and debilitating depri-
vations of civil rights in America today." 
Much of Unfinished Business is a call for renewed judicial pro-
tection of property rights and economic opportunity. Bolick main-
tains that natural law principles were incorporated into the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the fourteenth amendment. 
Thus, the central task is to reclaim natural rights, particularly eco-
nomic liberty and contractual freedom. Echoing Justice Stephen 
Field's famous dissenting opinion in Slaughterhouse, Bolick con-
tends that "the protection of basic economic liberty-the freedom 
to pursue a business or profession free from arbitrary or excessive 
governmental interference--was a foremost concern and object of 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment." Although the author 
applauds attempts to reinvigorate the takings clause,12 his stress on 
entrepreneurial opportunity leads him to urge far-ranging judicial 
scrutiny of economic regulations under the privileges or immunities 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Rather than casually accept 
legislative determinations at face value, courts should determine 
whether a given statute promotes a legitimate public purpose, and 
whether the law in fact achieves this end. 
Although his focus is largely on economic liberty, Bolick also 
addresses the topic of racial equality. He has little patience with the 
current crazy-quilt pattern of affirmative action schemes and racial 
preferences. Arguing that race-conscious remedies sometimes have 
perverse consequences that harm minorities, Bolick forcefully main-
tains that "racial classifications are never reasonable." He favors, 
however, vigorous enforcement of the civil rights of individuals. 
Bolick showcases Brown v. Barry•3 as an example of how his 
empowerment strategy both advances civil rights and strengthens 
12. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Propeny and the Power of Eminent Do-
main (Harv. U. Press, 1985); Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modem Plot for an 
Old Constitutional Tale, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. I (1989). 
13. 710 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1989). 
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economic liberty. At issue was a District of Columbia ordinance 
that prohibited sidewalk shoeshine stands. Bolick's Landmark 
Legal Foundation combined economic liberty arguments with evi-
dence that the ordinance was racially motivated in a legal challenge 
to the measure. The federal district court invalidated the ordinance 
on equal protection grounds, leading Bolick to see the case as part 
of his program "to restore protection for economic liberty as a fun-
damental civil right." As a possible next step, he recommends a 
challenge to the Davis-Bacon Act, which mandates payment of pre-
vailing wages on federal contracts. Reasoning that the Davis-Bacon 
Act was intended in part to restrict competition by black labor on 
public works projects, the author sees the law as a violation of both 
civil rights and economic liberty. 
In essence, Bolick has crafted a conservative civil rights 
agenda. He offers some fresh ideas to a civil rights debate that has 
become both stale and shrill. Bolick's proposals challenge the 
orthodoxies of the civil rights organizations and the assumptions of 
those who favor the racial status quo. Bolick has glimpsed the po-
tential for change and enlarged opportunity inherent in the doctrine 
of economic liberty. 
Although Bolick carefully grounds his economic liberty strat-
egy on the privileges or immunities clause rather than the due pro-
cess clause, his argument is strikingly similar to the doctrine of 
economic due process which prevailed from approximately 1890 to 
1937. Hence, Bolick's proposal will likely be evaluated in the con-
text of the debate over economic due process. t4 His plan would 
necessitate a high degree of judicial involvement in economic deci-
sions, a troublesome point to champions of judicial self-restraint. A 
more conservative Supreme Court may well be receptive to the con-
stitutional rights of property owners, but the Justices will no doubt 
be wary of assuming the activist role that Bolick seeks to assign 
them.ts Nor is it clear that large numbers of disadvantaged minori-
ties would benefit from the Bolick strategy. Members of the under-
class may lack the skills and initiative to compete successfully for 
enlarged opportunities in the open market. Nonetheless, Bolick 
should be commended for pushing the civil rights dialogue in a new 
direction, and for recognizing the central place of economic ad-
vancement in a successful civil rights program. 
14. See Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process 
Reconsidered, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1363 (1990). 
15. This theme is developed in James W. Ely, Jr., The Enigmatic Place of Property 
Rights in Modem Constitutional Thought, in David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr., 
eds., After 200 Years: The Bill of Rights in Modem America (Indiana U. Press, 1992) 
(forthcoming). 
1992] BOOK REVIEWS 115 
John Brigham's Property and the Politics of Entitlement is an 
attempt to resuscitate the hotly-debated notion of "new prop-
erty."I6 The author's essential complaint is that traditional prop-
erty rights "have always been far more generous than the rights to 
property associated with the welfare state." Cavalierly dismissing 
the constitutional significance of John Locke's view that property 
ownership is a natural right, Brigham struggles to explain the 
source and nature of property rights. At several points he empha-
sizes that "constitutional property" rests upon "a model of legiti-
mate expectation." Yet Brigham also inconsistently treats property 
ownership as dependent on the government. 
Brigham is persuaded that a major revival of judicial protec-
tion for property rights is underway. "[F]or federal judges," he tells 
us, "property has again become top dog." Brigham appears un-
happy about this trend. He decries "the Lochnerizing of the mod-
ern Court" and predicts the emergence of a new double standard 
with "two levels of constitutional property protection in the 
Supreme Court, one for the wealthy and one for the poor." Taking 
a page from the Progressive songbook, Brigham even accuses the 
Justices of "a class-based empathy" for "the upper class property 
owner." This revelation will surely come as news to employers and 
landowners, who have seen the Supreme Court sustain numerous 
legislative schemes designed to redistribute economic interests at 
the expense of property holders. 
As might be expected, Brigham gives particular attention to 
Goldberg v. Kelly 11 and its progeny. He recognizes that the Court 
has retreated from the concept of "new property," and strengthened 
legislative control of benefit programs. But he nevertheless insists 
that statutory benefits are a constitutionally protected form of prop-
erty despite ample evidence to the contrary. To his mind, a reduc-
tion in the level of welfare benefits represents a taking of property 
for which compensation is required under the fifth amendment. 
Support for such a position is conspicuously lacking. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has frequently rejected the "new property" theory. 
There is in fact no judicial or societal consensus that welfare bene-
fits are a form of property. Is Indeed, Brigham accurately notes that 
"the entitlement claims suggested in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
failed to sustain their initial aspiration." 
Brigham's stress on government authority over property cuts 
16. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964). 
17. 397 u.s. 254 (1970). 
18. See R. Shep Melnick, The Politics of the New Property: Welfare Rights in Congress 
and the Couns, in Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman, eds., Liberty, Property, and the 
Future of Constitutional Development 199-240 (State U. of N.Y. Press, 1990). 
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directly against this argument. It is exceedingly unlikely that "new 
property" will be accorded greater protection than traditional prop-
erty. If the government holds unrestrained sway over land use and 
business enterprise, surely it holds the same power over the extent 
of governmental benefit programs. Logically then Brigham should 
welcome rather than begrudge renewed judicial interest in the rights 
of property owners. 
There are still other difficulties with Brigham's approach. It 
seems questionable that welfare recipients have any legitimate ex-
pectancy that benefits will be continued indefinitely at a given level. 
Benefit programs are necessarily dependent upon future appropria-
tions, and thus are subject to modification. In short, there is no 
credible assurance that benefits will remain fixed. Moreover, Brig-
ham entirely fails to address the criticism that advocates of "new 
property" are simply promoting the liberal political agenda. These 
critics maintain that the drive to gain recognition for "new prop-
erty" is little more than a bid to constitutionalize the welfare state, 
and thus immunize welfare benefits against policy changes.t9 Brig-
ham also seems oblivious to the larger practical implications of his 
thesis. All levels of government currently face financial constraint 
and widespread resistance to higher taxes. Consequently, one may 
doubt whether the United States could afford to operate a social 
welfare system without the flexibility to reduce benefits in order to 
meet future contingencies. Brigham would have done well to ad-
dress the administrative problems and unforeseen adverse effects of 
constitutionalizing "new property. "2o 
One can hardly be surprised that the federal courts have been 
more solicitous of traditional property rights than welfare benefits. 
The Constitution, after all, contains several provisions expressly 
guaranteeing the rights of property owners. Moreover, there is a 
fundamental distinction between judicial protection of property 
rights against legislative infringement and the notion of "new prop-
erty." By guarding the rights of property owners the courts are 
acting in harmony with the central constitutional principle that 
governmental authority over individuals is restrained. The purpose 
of the Bill of Rights was to safeguard individual liberty, including 
economic rights, from governmental intrusion. Welfare rights, on 
the other hand, represent an affirmative claim to governmental 
assistance. Recognition of such rights would lead to judicial super-
19. Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court's 'Return' to Economic Regulation, 1 Studies in 
American Political Development 91 (Yale U. Press, 1986). 
20. Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 33·34 (Yale U. Press, 
1985). 
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vision of the budgetary process, thus altering the basic constitu-
tional scheme of divided powers. 
Unfortunately, clarity of expression is not one of Brigham's 
gifts. The text is repetitious, jargon-ridden, and cluttered with ref-
erence to the work of other scholars. Opaque sentences abound. 
More vigorous editing would have spared readers such puzzling ob-
servations as: 
It is not enough to acknowledge the world outside the authority 
of the state; we need to know the extent to which the law is actu-
ally autonomous and the extent to which the state reaches in to 
influence choices that might seem to be beyond the reach of the 
law, such as political strategies in the feminist antipornography 
movement. Due process rights, especially as they are becoming 
evident in the administrative context, rely on a vision of what it 
means to be a person. 
Even worse, chapters 2 and 6 fit poorly with the rest of the volume. 
These chapters probe such unrelated topics as tax assessments for 
agricultural land, the mechanics of the referendum establishing the 
California Coastal Commission, and a comparison of economic de-
velopment strategies in Portland and Halifax. Their inclusion is a 
mystery, except insofar as they permit Brigham to recapitulate 
some of his earlier studies. 
It seems questionable whether a compelling argument can be 
made that governmental benefits should be treated as property. 
This disappointing volume certainly fails to make the case. 
G. Richard Hill's Regulatory Taking: The Limits of Land Use 
Controls is a collection of twelve articles which originally appeared 
in the Urban Lawyer between 1980 and 1988. Taken as a group 
these essays provide a useful introduction to the complex topic of 
regulatory takings in the land use context. Despite a slight bias to-
ward the pro-regulatory side, the volume contains a fair balance of 
viewpoints. 
Articles dealing with the fast developing field of regulatory tak-
ing often have a short shelf life. Seven of the essays were written 
before the important takings decisions of 1987, and thus have been 
overtaken by events. Several of the earlier essays, notably those by 
Robert E. Manley and Kenneth B. Bley, correctly forecast the 
emergence of section 1983 actions as a landowner's remedy for ex-
cessive regulations.21 Despite her undue confidence in transferable 
development rights as a source of just compensation, Margaret V. 
21. Eugene J. Morris, New Developments in Federal Takings Law, 7 Pace Envir. L. Rev. 
309, 314-16 (1990). 
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Lang's article offers a helpful analysis of Justice Brennan's confused 
opinion in Penn Central. Nonetheless, this batch of essays seems 
already dated and remains useful primarily as background reading. 
Since all of the articles are readily available to scholars and practi-
tioners, it is unclear that they warranted reprinting. 
Predictably, the more recent articles focus on how to interpret 
the 1987 takings decisions, with particular emphasis on First Eng-
lish and Nollan. Nathaniel S. Lawrence believes that Nollan broke 
new ground and may signal heightened scrutiny for some takings 
cases. Although he asserts that the Supreme Court is struggling for 
more definite criteria to determine takings issues, Lawrence is un-
certain whether the Justices will read Nollan broadly in the future. 
David L. Callies worries that governmental interference with pri-
vate property has steadily increased. He details the use of building 
permits and impact fees to obtain funding of public facilities at the 
expense of private developers. Callies is concerned that recent 
lower court decisions have taken a restrictive view of Nollan and 
"do not reflect much change in judicial attitude toward regulatory 
takings." Indeed, he finds it necessary to remind readers that pri-
vate property is one of the "values and rights enshrined in the 
Constitution." 
In an innovative article John Mixon predicts a wave of section 
1983 actions against local governments for excessive land use con-
trols. To handle this situation, he proposes the creation of special-
ized land courts or agencies to hear regulatory takings cases on an 
expedited basis. These new tribunals, he maintains, should be 
designed "to avoid intrusive entry of federal courts into ordinary 
zoning disputes." 
Michael M. Berger's vigorously argued essay hails the new di-
rection in takings jurisprudence. He twits advocates of land regula-
tions who predicted dire consequences from the First English and 
Nollan decisions before they were rendered, and thereafter reversed 
gears and sought to minimize the significance of these rulings. Ber-
ger outlines the new rules governing taking questions, and con-
cludes that the Supreme Court has heightened the standard of 
judicial review for land use cases. Urging a broad reading of the 
fifth amendment, he contends that there is no principled distinction 
between physical and regulatory taking. The underlying concern is 
the protection of individual property owners from governmental ac-
tion, not the nature of the government's conduct. 
One comment in Lang's article cuts to the heart of the regula-
tory taking controversy. "Cities," she tells us, "simply cannot af-
ford to pay just compensation for the landmarks worthy of 
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preservation." What this really means is that the general public 
does not assign a sufficiently high priority to historic preservation to 
pay taxes for the acquisition of historic buildings through eminent 
domain. Much the same could be said for low-income housing, ac-
cess to privately-owned beaches, or a host of other public facilities. 
Accustomed to a large degree of judicial deference, land use plan-
ners have devised aggressive schemes to compel private landowners 
and developers in effect to finance projects for which taxpayers are 
unwilling to pay. This practice brings to mind Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes' warning that "a strong public desire to improve the 
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."22 
The purpose of the takings clause, as explained by the Supreme 
Court, is to prevent the "government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole." Singling out a handful 
of property owners to carry the expense of providing public facili-
ties and amenities violates the takings clause. Yet this is the effect 
of numerous land use regulations. Indeed, Lang acknowledges that 
New York City's historical landmark law places "an unfair burden 
on the Railroad." A broad understanding of Nollan would, of 
course, curtail the ability of land use planners to achieve ulterior 
purposes through regulation rather than purchase.2J 
Spurred by renewed judicial interest, the dialogue over the con-
stitutional protection of property ownership is likely to continue. 
None of the volumes under review offers the final word, but they do 
illustrate the wide range of perspectives that participants bring to 
the debate. 
THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION. 
By Lucas A. Powe, Jr.' Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 357. Cloth $29.95. 
Donald M. Gillmor 2 
Unreconstructed liberalism shines through this historically ag-
ile, closely reasoned, brightly written and largely satisfying piece of 
22. Pennsy/IIQnia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
23. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. I. 
I. Professor, School of Law and Department of Government, and holder of the Anne 
Green Regents Chair at the University of Texas at Austin. 
2. Silha Professor of Media Ethics and Law, University of Minnesota. 
